





The 11th Panzer Division in the Fighting for the

DNEPR Bridge near GORNOSTAYPOL,

23 to 29 August 1941.

Table of Contents.

1. Combat mission of the 11th Panzer Division.
2. Approach march and assembly area.
3. 11th Infantry Division enters combat.
4. Advance of Task Force L, and its fight for the bridge.
5. Establishment of the bridgehead.
6. Thrust toward OSTER.
7. Destruction of DNEPR Bridge by the Russians.
8. Countermeasures taken by the Russian Command.
9. Operations of 25 August.
10. Withdrawal to KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA on 26 August.
11. Fighting on 27 August and retirement behind the VYDRA Swamps.
12. Relief of the Division and replacement by the 11th Infantry Division.



The 11th Panzer Division in the Fighting for the DNEPR  
Bridge near GORNOSTAYPOL, 60 kilometers north  
of KIEV, from 23 to 29 August 1941.

[1] After the 11th Panzer Division had pushed back the Russian forces southwest of KIEV, and had mopped up the remnants in the DNEPR bend near KANEV, (9-16 August), the division was pulled out and ordered to move into the area south of STROKOV for a brief rest, and overhaul of vehicles.

South of KIEV, the German command succeeded during the course of the battle for that fortified city in pushing the Russian forces back to and across the DNEPR; west of KIEV, they pushed the Soviets into the city's outskirts. The northern wing of Sixth Army (Reichenau), however, fell far behind because the Russian positions to the west of KIEV stood fast and extended in a salient into the PRIPET marshes north of KOROSTEN.

Aside from the bridges in KIEV itself, the only bridge capable of carrying all types of vehicles was located in this sector near the village of GORNOSTAYPOL, approximately 60 kilometers north of KIEV. The German command was anxious to break through the Russian positions also in this sector of the front, to throw the enemy forces back to -- or, if possible across -- the DNEPR, in order to be able to mount a surprise attack, take the bridge intact, and establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the river. After that mission was accomplished, operations were to be extended across the DNEPR and DESNA.

To this end, the 11th Panzer Division was attached to Sixth Army. Its mission was as follows:

[2] Combat Mission of 11th Panzer Division.

"The 11th Panzer Division, moving through the sector of the 11th



[2] Infantry Division (in position there), will -- by a surprise thrust -- take the DNEPR Bridge at GORNOSTAYPOL intact. The division will establish and hold a strong bridgehead on the east bank until the arrival of the infantry. Reconnaissance is to be pushed to the DESNA."

On 23 August, at daybreak, the 111th Infantry Division was to attack along its entire front after a short artillery preparation, break through the enemy positions on the eastern bank of the RISNYA and STUDYA, and throw the retreating enemy back across the DNEPR. After establishment of the bridgehead on the east bank by the 11th Panzer Division, the 111th Infantry Division was to take over, and advance from the bridgehead toward OSTER.

Simultaneously with the commitment of its infantry, the 111th Infantry Division was to send out Advance Detachment Ho (see annex No. 2) along the road OLIVA --- IVANKOV --- GORNOSTAYPOL. This detachment, too, was to attempt the capture of the DNEPR Bridge at GORNOSTAYPOL (see annex No. 4).

Approach March and Assembly Area.

[3] In view of the insignificance of Russian air reconnaissance, Task Force L moved to the assembly area south of MALIN (see annex No. 3) on 22 August in broad daylight and in one phase. Army assumed that the movement of an armored division over bad roads with its attendant dust clouds could not remain hidden from the Soviet Command anyway, but that the enemy would not have time to take countermeasures of any importance. Thus, only the last 20 kilometers north of the main road ZHITOMIR --- KIEV were covered by the forward elements at dusk, and by the main body



[3] in darkness. This served to hide from enemy view the assembly area in the woods which were straddling the MALIN --- RADOMYSHL road south of MALIN. For the approach march, only one single route was available which led only for certain stretches over highways with solid roadbeds. As a result, the last elements of the combat troops reached their assembly area long after midnight, and -- before resuming the march -- had no time for first echelon maintenance absolutely necessary prior to combat.

Attack by 111th Infantry Division on 23 August.

At dawn of 23 August, after a brief artillery preparation, the assault detachments of the 111th Infantry Division attacked and penetrated the enemy positions -- in most instances during the first assault. The enemy, who in some places offered tenacious resistance, was gradually pushed back toward the east and northeast. As a result of dogged resistance of enemy rear guards, and sporadic, forceful counterthrusts, the forward elements of the 111th Infantry Division reached their objective -- that is, the line from which the 11th Panzer Division was to start its thrust toward the bridge -- three hours later than originally calculated by the German command.

[4] The Advance of Task Force L.

In view of unfavorable road conditions which confined the advance of the main body of the division to the somewhat better constructed road BAZAR --- MAYANOVKA --- TERMAKHOVKA --- GORNOSTAYPOL, the Commanding General of the 11th Panzer Division organized a strong **task** force, called Task Force L [Kampfgruppe L]. (For order of battle see annex No. 2). This force was to have adequate striking power and sufficient mobility to be able to reach TERMAKHOVKA by way of country roads, or, if necessary, cross country. Wheel-



[4] ing south, it was to proceed along the road IVANKOV --- GORNOSTAYPOL --- STRAKHOLESYE, and capture the bridge. Later, the main body of the division was to advance on STRAKHOLESYE along the above-mentioned road.

The reconnaissance battalion, reinforced for its mission by engineers, preceded Task Force L as its point. During the advance on TERMAKHOVKA, the battalion ran into great difficulties outside of RUDNYA. The advance over the unimproved dirt roads was slow; it was entirely impossible off the road through the marshland. Most bridges had been blown up or set on fire at the **last** moment by the retreating Russians. The remaining bridges across the numerous brooks and rivulets that flowed mostly perpendicular to the line of advance, proved too weak for tanks and motor vehicles. Since the marshy river beds made fording impossible, bridges had to be hastily reinforced or newly constructed. This resulted in unforeseen delays in the advance. In addition, available maps proved insufficient in number and utterly inaccurate. A further delay was caused by the fact that the 111th Infantry Division, unaccustomed to co-operation with armored units, occupied the roads instead of keeping them cleared of infantry, and also blocked the way with its vehicles. This slowed down the advance of the reconnaissance battalion and subsequent passage of Task Force L. The speed of the advance increased toward noon as the troops reached the highway at DBUKHOVICH I.

Wherever the reconnaissance battalion encountered minor enemy opposition in the villages, it was broken without dismounting, and the troops reached IVANKOV and PRIBORSK. There, Soviet resistance stiffened. Russian rear guards, concentrically retreating toward the bridge site at GORNOSTAYPOL,



[5]

tried to stop the German advance once more. In vain! For simultaneously with the point of Task Force L, Advance Detachment Ho, 111th Infantry Division, advancing east from OLIVA, had fought its way to IVANKOROV. The detachment was now attached to Task Force L, and an attack by both units broke the Russian opposition. All further enemy attempts to stop the German advance by desperate resistance and counterattacks failed. GORNOSTAYPOL fell into German hands, and in a daring thrust our men reached STRAKHOLESYE and the bridge. Elements of the Russian forces were pushed northward and away from the bridge site into the marshy woodlands north of the line GORNOSTAYPOL --- STRAKHOLESYE.

[6]

The bridge itself was approximately 1200 meters long. The enemy withdrew across it and tried to set fire to it at the last moment. The motorcycle rifle companies of the reconnaissance battalion, the bicycle riflemen of Advance Detachment Ho, and the assault guns, following hard on the heels of the retreating enemy, were able to frustrate this attempt. The east bank was reached, and by about 1700 the DNEPR Bridge was in German hands -- undamaged.

Establishment of the Bridgehead. (23 - 24 August).

The most important task was now the immediate capture of territory on the east bank in order to be able to establish the bridgehead. However, the forces available at the time did not suffice for the undertaking. With hastily collected troops, the Russians launched forceful counterthrusts, and tried to retake the bridge at all costs. Strong elements of Task Force L were tied down defending themselves against attacks along the west bank of the DNEPR and from the marshy woodlands. The island over which the



[6] bridge led had to be cleared of snipers and machine-gun nests in bitter hand-to-hand fighting. The motorcycle and bicycle riflemen of the reconnaissance battalion and Advance Detachment Ho, who were tenaciously holding on to the east bank of the river, were just barely able to repulse the repeatedly attacking Russians with the help of assault guns drawn up on the eastern part of the bridge. Because of the limited width of the bridge, not more than two assault guns could be used simultaneously. Due to the previously described difficult advance routes, our own artillery and tanks had not arrived as yet. The main body of the division was still far behind. The approaches to the bridge itself created an especially tough problem. The bridge was accessible only over a stone dam that was almost 1 1/2 kilometers long and rose high above the swamp. Dam and bridge were under continuous enemy machine-gun fire. In practice, the bridge was inaccessible as long as the surrounding marshy woodlands were not cleared of machine-gun nests.

[7] About 1900, the Russians again mounted a strong counterattack on the east bank, supported by bombing and strafing of bridge and island by several Ratas.\* The division commander, Colonel A., who happened to be on the island, was seriously wounded. Despite all difficulties, the small force committed along the east bank weathered the crisis, repelled all attacks, and somewhat advanced our own lines at dusk. As night fell, not only was the bridge in the hands of the 11th Panzer Division, but a bridgehead, even if small, had also been established as ordered.

Unfortunately, the main body of the 11th Panzer Division (111th Armored Infantry Regiment, tank regiment, and artillery) was completely bogged

\*Ed. Russian fighter planes.



[7] down on the so-called roads until 2300, and was not able to continue the advance until dawn. Once again, Russian swamps and woods had proved stronger than tanks and motor transports, and had upset all calculations.

It was vitally necessary that the bridgehead be reinforced. This was accomplished by pulling out the companies committed on the west bank, and replacing them with a weak covering force. Initially, these companies had been placed there as protection against possible enemy thrusts, particularly from OPATCHITSY where strong enemy rear guards had assembled. These were expected to attack the bridge in order to force their own retreat across the DNEPR.

Surprisingly enough, though, the Russians -- quite contrary to their habits -- remained quiet during the night. They did not repeat their attacks against the bridgehead position. This made possible the further advance and improvement of our lines, and also enabled the bridgehead complement to dig in deeper. In addition, elements of the corps engineer battalion succeeded in advancing to the bridge site. Through the commitment of Engineer Headquarters commanded by Major Mi., the combat troops were relieved of the technical work which had been a heavy burden to them.

[8] German thrust toward OSTER. (24 August). (see annex no. 5).

At dawn, the armored car sections of the reconnaissance battalion tried to push beyond the outpost line of the bridgehead position along the road to OSTER. The attempt failed. A strong Kampfgruppe (consisting of elements of the reconnaissance battalion, Advance Detachment Ho, and 1st Battalion, 110th Armored Infantry Regiment) was assembled, and mounted an attack. Only then did the advance elements succeed in effecting a breach, overcoming



[8] enemy resistance in LOSHAKOVA-GUTA and KARPILOVKA, and advancing to KARPILOVKA and the DESNA.

The leading companies were in the process of taking the approaches to the DESNA Bridge in a swift, bold attack, when superior Soviet Russian forces, brought up from GOMEL and CHERNIGOV, succeeded in beating off our surprise raid at the last moment. The companies of the 110th Armored Infantry, which had penetrated to the bridge, were bled white under the raging rifle and machine-gun fire from the east bank. They suffered heavy losses, and had to withdraw to the KRYMKA. After the arrival of elements of the 111th Armored Infantry Regiment, several new attempts to take the bridge collapsed in the Russian fire.

[9] In the morning of 24 August, Corps R., which had the mission of directing the DNEPR crossing, effected a change in the chain of command. Originally, the 11th Panzer Division had been attached to Corps R. by Army with the mission of taking the bridge at GORNOSTAYPOL and establishing a bridgehead. Now that this mission had been accomplished by the 11th Panzer Division, all troops on the east bank of the DNEPR were placed under the commander of the 111th Infantry Division. Thus, in addition to his own troops, he assumed command over all elements of the 11th Panzer Division that had been dispatched across the bridge by the acting commander of the 11th Panzer Division during the morning of 24 August. These included the 110th and 111th Armored Infantry Regiments, one light and one medium battery of the armored artillery regiment, the division headquarters repair and maintenance section, and parts of the armored signal battalion. The command element of 111th Infantry Division crossed about 0900, and later established its CP in the school house at KARPILOVKA.



[9]

Destruction of the DNEPR Bridge.

At that time an event occurred which threatened to destroy all that had previously been achieved. A Russian low-level air attack, supporting a sweep of several Soviet river gunboats up the DNEPR from KIEV, succeeded about 1000 in setting fire to the eastern half of the bridge. In the beginning it seemed as if the engineers would succeed in checking the fire. However, all efforts proved to be in vain. A rising wind fanned the flames anew, and soon the entire eastern part of the bridge was burning brightly. In order to avoid an even greater catastrophe, the commander of the bridge, Major Mi., was forced to close the bridge to all traffic, just as the vehicles of the armored artillery regiment were pushing across through smoke and flames. The commander of the armored artillery regiment found himself on the east bank with his headquarters, one light and one medium battery, but minus his combat train -- a fact that disastrously affected the subsequent fighting at KARPILOVKA. When the two batteries were committed on 25 August they had at their disposal 40 and 17 rounds of ammunition, respectively.

[10]

Toward noon, the commander of the 11th Panzer Division crossed the burning bridge together with his operations section. For the next five days of fighting he was separated from his tanks and all his artillery with the exception of two batteries. Not until 26 August was it possible -- by employing 16-ton ferries -- to send nine medium tanks, three assault guns, and several artillery pieces to the aid of the hard-pressed infantry.

The chief engineer officer immediately tried to repair those parts of the bridge that had been destroyed by the flames. It proved impossible



[10] to carry out the intended repairs since the technical difficulties could not be overcome. The idea was abandoned with reluctance. It became necessary to establish a ferry service. Because of our own weak anti-aircraft defenses, the ferries could operate only at night, and the service was therefore not equal to demand. On 28 August, construction of a new 10-ton bridge was started below the old bridge site.

Countermeasures taken by the Russian Command. (see annexes 5 and 6).

The Russian command had meanwhile taken countermeasures. In addition to the troops that had been thrown against OSTER and thus prevented capture of the bridge, other enemy units had been landed from river monitors and boats south of OSTER on the west bank of the DESNA (see overlay). During the course of the afternoon, these units, preceded by their advance elements, probed their way toward the camp at VYPOLZOVO. At dusk they moved out of the woods west of the camp and advanced against the troops that were committed there, that is, one company of the 111th Armored Infantry Regiment. By reinforcing the company with a mobile reserve assault detachment, the attack was beaten off. However, renewed attacks were to be expected during the night, since experience had taught us that the Russians preferred to attack in woods or at night.

[11] In addition, three [Russian] divisions were advancing on a broad front from CHERNIGOV against the GORNOSTAIPOL---OSTER road. Their points reached the woods north of KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA toward evening, and cut the OKUNINOVO---KARPILOVKA motor highway at several points. Evacuation of wounded, and re-establishment of contact between KARPILOVKA and friendly troops at the bridge site were made possible solely through the employment of a motorized assault detachment consisting of four reconnaissance cars, two of which were armed. Every time this assault detachment had passed the points of ob-



[11]       struction, the Russians would again cut the road.

The complete encirclement of the elements of the 11th Panzer Division and the parts of the Advance Detachment of the 111th Infantry Division at KARPILOVKA, as well as a concentric attack by five Soviet infantry divisions (prisoners had been taken from five different divisions) against the positions along the DESNA had to be expected on 25 August or on 26 August at the latest. The first and foremost problem at the time was the transfer of additional forces across the DNEPR in order to contain the expected enemy counterattack. Unfortunately, the few engineers then available did not succeed prior to the Russian attack in transporting vitally necessary reinforcements, particularly artillery supplied with ammunition, and tanks across to the east bank.

We were made to pay heavily for the fact that our own air force and antiaircraft defenses were not employed in a manner corresponding to the importance of the mission. Because of inadequate photo reconnaissance prior to the attack of 23 August, sufficiently clear aerial photographs of the routes over which armored units could advance to the bridge site did not exist. (The observation squadron, originally attached to the division at the start of the Eastern Campaign, remained at Headquarters, Panzer Army Kleist at the time when the 11th Panzer Division was transferred to Sixth Army.) Available maps proved unreliable, and caused miscalculations in the timetable that jeopardized the success of the entire plan.

[12]       A second aggravating factor was the lack of German fighter formations during the fighting for the bridgehead. This, and the fact that our own flak battalion had not arrived as yet, enabled a few Soviet Ratas to launch



[12]

repeated attacks from their bases at the KIEV airport, to delay appreciably the crossing of our own forces on 23 August, to set fire to the bridge in the morning of 24 August, and -- in addition -- to prevent the operation of any regular ferry service during daytime on 25 and 26 August. Only after a Slovak fighter squadron was committed did it become possible to operate the ferry service and rush construction of the new bridge also during daytime. Experience had shown that the presence of one German fighter plane in the air was sufficient to keep the sky clear of enemy aircraft.

The elements of the 11th Panzer Division and the 111th Infantry Division that had crossed on 23 August and in the morning of 24 August were now 25 kilometers east of the bridge. They were facing a gradual encirclement by five Russian divisions, were without sufficient ammunition and rations, and their supply routes were insecure. Army ordered supply by air. In practice, however, the amount of ammunition, fuel, and rations dropped near KARPILOVKA was not in the least sufficient; hardly one tenth of the requirements were filled in this manner.

Fighting on 25 August. (see annex No. 5.)

[13]

On 25 August, the Russians started their attack on the camp at VYPOLZOVO. The enemy penetrated into the village itself, but in an immediate bayonet attack weak elements of 111th Armored Infantry Regiment succeeded once more in throwing the enemy back into the woods. Also a second and third attempt collapsed in the fire of the armored infantry. It was at this time that our ammunition shortage began to make itself felt. Friendly artillery support had to cease, since the last 17 rounds had to be saved for the main enemy attack on KARPILOVKA. Mortars, antitank guns, and machine guns had com-



[13] pletely expended their ammunition, and each rifleman had hardly a clip of ammunition left. In a fourth attack shortly before dusk, the Russians seized the camp. During the night the company's position in the village of VYPOLZOVO became untenable. The company withdrew toward LUTAVA (south) for the purpose of covering the right flank of the 111th Infantry Regiment.

Almost simultaneously with the **first** attack on the camp at VYPOLZOVO, Soviet infantry, having crossed the DESNA south of OSTER during the night of 24/25 August, tried to seize LUTAVA in a surprise thrust. The attempt failed. During the course of the day, the Russians -- despite heavy losses -- persisted in throwing their infantry into repeated attacks across the marshlands. The riflemen of the 110th Armored Infantry Regiment, up to their chests in water and morass, repulsed all attacks. Because of our painful inferiority in the air, we did not succeed during daytime in ferrying any significant number of troops across the DNEPR. The Russians, on the other hand, continuously reinforced their infantry on the west bank of the DESNA with fresh and strong forces. From noon on, the enemy's infantry received artillery support from the areas east and southeast of OSTER. Because of the lack of ammunition, our own two batteries were relegated to the role of silent observers. As a result, the Russians succeeded in pushing their lines to the KRYMKA River before nightfall.

[14] In the afternoon of 25 August, also the Russian divisions that were approaching from the north established contact with our flank security (Battalion Kl. of the 111th Armored Infantry Regiment) near RUDNYA-KOROPYE. Two Soviet attacks -- in the late afternoon and at dusk -- were repulsed, but a repetition of these attacks with additional reinforcements had to be



[14] reckoned with during the night or, at the latest, on the following morning. Furthermore, strong enemy infantry units were probing their way via KOSACHEVKA toward KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA. And still we had not succeeded in ferrying appreciable reinforcements across the DNEPR -- not to speak of artillery and tanks.

Fighting on 26 August and withdrawal to KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA.

As had been expected, the Russians attacked the Task Force (General Z.) with far superior forces along the entire front in the early morning of 26 August. At that time our troops had for four days been engaged in continuous heavy fighting. It was only due to their valor that the enemy was thrown back once more. However, 25 kilometers from the bridge site, without artillery, without tanks, without sufficient ammunition, the troops -- entirely on their own -- could not be expected to withstand the onslaught of five Russian divisions. In addition to all this, KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA was reported occupied by the enemy. The motor highway was thus cut, and closed to any and all supply traffic. General Z. decided to give up the completely hopeless positions at KARPILOVKA, and to withdraw his task force to KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA.

Battalion Fl. of the 111th Infantry Regiment, in reserve in the woods west of KARPILOVSKAYA, was ordered to retake KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA, and to open the highway up to the bridge site. In a lightning attack the Russians were thrown out of KARPILOVSKAYA-GUTA, and pushed back into the swamps and woods north and northeast of that town. During the course of the morning, headquarters of General Z. moved its CP to the forester's house; the troops were withdrawn from LUTAVA and KARPILOVKA. Task Force General Z., was thus saved from the destruction that threatened them on the DESNA.



[15] The Russians did not press on along the west bank of the DESNA with the expected intensity. However, from the woods north and northeast of KAPILOVSKAYA-GUTA they attacked Task Force Colonel B., which had been reinforced by the 110th and the 2d Battalion of the 111th Armored Infantry Regiment. Several times the Russians succeeded in breaking through the village of KAPILOVSKAYA-GUTA to the highway. They kept surging forth from the woods, but the troops of the task force -- under the personal command of battalion and regimental commanders -- pushed them back in hand-to-hand fighting in which every man down to the last clerk and radio operator was committed. The sun had set behind the DNEPR woods. The stars were illuminating the nocturnal sky, and still the Russian "hurrah" would well up periodically, only to choke in the burst of the hand grenades and the submachine-gun fire of the tenaciously fighting motorcycle riflemen and armored infantrymen. Eight times the Russians charged in vain against the handful of valiant riflemen. Eight times they were beaten back by the numerically inferior infantrymen. But here, in woods and swamps, the Russians were thoroughly at home.

Fighting on 27 August. Withdrawal behind the swamp west of KAPILOVSKAYA-GUTA

On 27 August, the Russians attacked in greater strength also from the south--one might almost say on a mass production basis. Since the positions around KAPILOVSKAYA-GUTA were no longer tenable, General Z. withdrew his badly mauled troops to the western edge of the VYDRA swamps along the general line OSHITKI---edge of the woods west of the VYDRA swamps---Nov. GLYBOV (see annex No. 7). By that time, however, 17 medium tanks and two battalions of infantry of the 111th Infantry Division had been ferried across the DNEPR.



[15] They were soon followed by the 3d Battalion, and by the other two regiments as well as by artillery. Ferry service, now conducted also during daytime, put the necessary reinforcements across the river. Soon, the entire 111th Infantry Division was in the bridgehead area. An additional division followed.

[16] Relief of the 11th Panzer Division.

The danger had passed, and the DNEPR crossing had been forced. The 11th Panzer Division had accomplished its mission. Since the situation permitted it, Army gave orders for the 11th Panzer Division to disengage during the night of 28 - 29 August. Thus, the first elements [of the division] were transferred to the west bank during that night. The remaining units followed during the next two nights. The division was pulled back into the area ZHITOMR---BERDICHEV for a brief rest and overhauling.

On ..... August, the DNEPR crossing at CHERKASSY fell into German hands. In a two-pronged envelopment we had succeeded in unhinging the DNEPR defenses. The great battle for KIEV entered into its decisive phase. It ended victoriously in the destruction of five Soviet armies.



Order of Battle, 11th Panzer Division  
\*\*\*\*\*

HQ, 11th Panzer Division (A.)

HQ, 11th Arm'd Infantry Brigade

<u>HQ&amp;HQ Co, 11th Arm'd Inf Regt (B.)</u> (Motorcycle Messengers, Regimental Sig Sect.)	<u>HQ&amp;HQ Co, 110th Arm'd Inf Regt (L.)</u> (Motorcycle Messengers, Regimental Sig Sect.)
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<u>2d Bn (mtz) (Fl.)</u> HQ & Bn Sig Sect Hv Wpns Co MG Co 3 Rifle Co's	<u>1st Bn (mtz) (K1)</u> HQ & Bn Sig Sect Hv Wpns Co MG Co 3 Rifle Co's	<u>2d Bn (mtz)</u> HQ & Bn Sig Sect Hv Wpns Co MG Co 3 Rifle Co's	<u>1st Bn (mtz) (Hi.)</u> HQ & Bn Sig Sect Hv Wpns Co MG Co 3 Rifle Co's (2d Co on 1/2-tracks)
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<u>HQ&amp;HQ Co, AT Battalion (mtz)</u> (Sch.)	<u>Artillery Regiment, HQ, (M.)</u>	<u>Obsn. Bn (mtz)</u>
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3 AT Co's (mtz)

<u>HQ, 3d Bn</u> (Bau)	<u>HQ, 2d Bn</u>	<u>HQ, 1st Bn</u>
3 bttries 88-mm AA guns (mtz)	3 bttries 105-mm hows (Mtz)	3 bttries 105-mm hows (mtz)

HQ, Engineer Battalion

2 Co's (mtz) 1 Co (1/2-tracks)  
1 Engr. lt. transpt. clm (mtz)  
1 bridging clm (mtz)

HQ, 15th Tank Regiment (R.)

<u>HQ, 2d Bn (LE.)</u>	<u>HQ, 1st Bn (Gr Schi)</u>
1 Co, hv tanks 3 Co's med tks	1 Co, hv tanks 3 Co's med tks

1 repair shop, 1 light motor truck clm, 1 filling station

HQ, 61st Motorcycle Rifle Bn (v.G.)

HQ Co, (Engr, AT, Sig Sections)  
4 Motorcycle Rifle Co's

HQ, Reconnaissance Battalion (v.U.)

Hv Wpns Co (mtz)  
1 Motorcycle Rifle Co  
2 Arm'd Car Co's

HQ, Signal Bn

1 Radio Co, (mtz)  
1 telephone  
Co, (mtz)

HQ, Divisional Services of Supply

1 Supply Co (mtz)  
7 lt. motor transport columns  
(30 tons each)  
2 lt. motor fuel transport clms  
(25 cu meters each)















1 Bakery Co, 1 slaughter plat, 1 Field Post Office

1 tank maint. Co, 1 medical Co (mtz)
















# KRIEGSGLIEDERUNG 11. PANZER-DIVISION

August 1941





11. Sch. Brig.





Order of Battle, Task Force L, 23 August, 1941.

\*\*\*\*\*

(see Annex No. 1)

HQ, 110th Arm'd Infantry Regiment

Reconnaissance Battalion (less one Co.)

61st Motorcycle Rifle Bn.

2d Bn., 110th Infantry

1 AT Co

1 Co med tanks

1 btry 105-mm hows (mtz) )

) held up at RUDNYA

1 Engr Co (on half-tracks)

Order of Battle, Advance Detachment Ho of 111th Infantry Division, 23 Aug 1941

\*\*\*\*\*

1 Bicycle Bn, made up of bicycle platoons of the regiments.


1 Assault Gun Battery.





Anlage 2.


Gliederung der Kampfgruppe L. vom 29.8.41


1. mit Am L. 1.


 Stab S.R. 110


 A.A. ohne 1 Kp


 Knadsch. Btl. 61

 II./S.R. 110


 1 Kp. Re. Jäger


 1 Kp. m. Panzer } blieben bereits hinter Rudnia hängen

 1 Bn.

 1 Pio. Kp.

Gliederung der Voranschlag. Ho. im 111. S. T. vom 29.8.41.

 Radfahrbl. zusammengestellt aus den Radfahrzügen der Rgler.  
erteilt Pioniere

 1 Sturmgeschütz. Bn





A.A. ohne 1 Kp




Knadsch. Btl. 61




II./S.N. 110



1 Kp. Re. Jäger




1 Kp. m. Panzer



1 Btr.

} blieben bereits hinter Audma hängen



1 Pio. Kp.

Gliederung der Voranschlag. Ho." im 111. J. P. vom 29.8.41.



Radfahr. Btl. zusammengestellt aus den Radfahrzügen der Regter, eingeteilt Pioniere




1 Sturmgeschütz. Btr.

MS# D-277



Sketch, Approach March to the Assembly Area.



Legend:

- <<< - route of approach march, 11th Panzer Div.
- ▭ Rest Area
- Assembly Area


Scale, approx. 1:1,000,000








Sketch, Advance to the Bridge







# SKIZZE FÜR VORMARSCH ZUR BRÜCKE

## Erklärungen:

Maßstab: ca 1:300 000.

Rückzugrichtung der Genj.

→ → → Vormarsch der Kampfgruppe "L" der 11. Panz. Div.

- - - " " "Vorausabt. Ho" " 111. S.D.

Anlage 4

Anlage 4

10000




Situation, 24 Aug 1941, Evening



Arm'd cars

1st Bn, 111th Arm'd Inf.



No Scale

Legend:

Russian Rcn patrols or smaller units

" start of approach march

" positions

Bridgehead position, 24 Aug, starting point of advance


2 one Bn, 111th Inf, as mobile reserve of Task Force Bo  
less one Co.

TF Bo consisted of all elements of 11th Panzer Div and Adv Det Ho of 111th Inf Div committed along the DESNA.



LAGE AM 24.8.41, Abds.

Anluzn 5.



Ohne Maßstab.

Erklärungen:

- sovjet. Spätrupp oder kleine Abtgn.
- " " Marschanfänge
- " " Stellungen

1. Brückenkopfstellung am 24.8. am der hinaus der Vormarsch angeht







Situation, 25 Aug, eve  
26 " , morn

1 Russ Div

1 Russ Div

1 Russ Div

Russ Arty




1st Bn, 111th Arm'd Inf

2d Bn, 111th Inf



Arty btry  
Arty btry




2d Bn, 110th Arm'd  
Inf

HQ, 11th Panzer Div  
HQ, 111th Inf Div  
Forester's House



1st Bn, 110th Arm'd Inf



Motorcycle Rifle Bn

Russ arty

1 Sov Div

1 Russ Div

No Scale


Legend:

for greater clarity, towns are  
designated by their initial letter,  
troops in full.

(see Legend annex 5)



LAGE AM 25.8. ABDS.  
UND 26.8. MORGS.




Ohne Maßstab.

Erläuterungen:

Da bessere Übersichtlichkeit wegen sind Orte  
nur mit Anfangsbuchstaben - Truppen voll bezeichnet.  
f. ferner die Erläuterungen in Anlage 5.





n. P. 1.  
 P. M. 3. 1.  
 ab 120. 20. 8.

Ohne Maßstab.

Erläuterungen:


Da besserer Übersichtlichkeit wegen sind Orte  
 nur mit Anfangsbuchstaben - Truppen voll bezeichnet.  
 ferner die Erläuterungen in Anlage 5.

# D-279




Situation, 27 Aug, Eve



 OKUNINOVO

HQ, 111th Inf Div

Task Force  
Col. Bo

 OSHITKY

1 Bn, 111th Inf Div


VYDRA  
SWAMPS


From OSTER

No Scale

Legend:

See overlay 5 and 6


 Ferry site

 Bridge construction

Situation, 28 Aug 1941

Task  
Force  
Col. B


HQ

 1 Regt, 111th Inf Div



Lage am 27.8.41. Abds.

Anlage 7



Ohne Maßstab


Erläuterungen

1. Anlage 5 u. 6


—●— Süßstelle

≡ Brückenschlag

LAGE AM 28.8.41








Ohne Maßstab

Erläuterungen

- 1. Anlage S.M.G
- Süßstelle
- ≡ Brückenschlag

LAGE AM 28.8.41



MS#D-278